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Interpreting Intent 
HOW RESEARCH ON FOLK JUDGMENTS OF 
INTENTIONALITY CAN INFORM STATUTORY 
ANALYSIS 
Julia Kobick & Joshua Knobe† 
On May 4, 2009, the Supreme Court released its opinion 
in Shell Oil Co. v. United States.1 The case was not only an 
important one in environmental law, but it also raised a 
number of complex conceptual issues. In particular, the Court 
found that it had to make a difficult decision about the 
relationship between liability and intentionality. 
The facts of the case were as follows: Shell Oil Co. 
contracted to sell a hazardous pesticide to an independent 
chemical distribution company.2 Shell knew that some of the 
pesticide would inevitably end up leaking or spilling as it was 
being transferred into the distribution company’s holding 
tanks, but Shell was not actively trying to make the pesticide 
leak.3 Its goal was just to sell and transport the pesticide. In 
other words, Shell had the knowledge that its actions would be 
leading to pesticide leaks, but its purpose was not to create 
these leaks, but rather to sell a useful product. Predictably, the 
dangerous pesticide regularly leaked during transfer, leading 
to extensive soil and groundwater contamination.4 The 
Environmental Protection Agency spent $8 million cleaning up 
the environmental damage and sued the parties connected to 
the environmental harm, including Shell, for remediation 
costs.5 
  
 † Julia Kobick, J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School. Joshua Knobe, 
Assistant Professor, Program in Cognitive Science and Department of Philosophy, Yale 
University. Thanks to Richard Lazarus, Fiery Cushman, Adam Kolber and Neal 
Feigenson for their insightful comments.  
 1 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States (Shell Oil Co.), 129 S. Ct. 
1870 (2009). 
 2 Id. at 1874-75. 
 3 See id. at 1875. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 1876. 
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Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),6 Shell could be 
considered liable for cleanup costs if it had “arranged for 
disposal . . . of hazardous substances,”7 a condition which some 
courts had interpreted as requiring a degree of intentionality in 
causing the hazardous substances to be disposed.8 The Court 
was therefore faced with a complex question. Given that Shell 
had the knowledge that it would be disposing of the pesticide 
but did not act with the purpose of disposing of it, could it 
rightly be said to have disposed of the substance with sufficient 
intentionality to render it liable under CERCLA? 
The Court’s decision in Shell can serve as a kind of case 
study of a broader question: how to determine whether an act 
counts as intentional or unintentional. This question has 
played a crucial role in numerous branches of legal scholarship, 
figuring in key debates concerning everything from civil rights 
law9 to criminal law.10 It has been approached from numerous 
different theoretical perspectives.11 
Our aim here is to introduce a new consideration into 
the existing literature on this question. A growing body of 
empirical work in experimental philosophy has examined the 
patterns in people’s ordinary judgments about whether specific 
acts were performed intentionally or unintentionally. This 
work suggests that such judgments are based on a 
  
 6 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607-9675 (2006). 
 7 Id. § 9607(a)(3). 
 8 Compare United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 
948 (9th Cir. 2008) (CERCLA permits arranger liability when the hazardous waste is a 
“foreseeable byproduct of, but not the purpose of, the transaction . . . .”) with United 
States v. Cello-Foil Prods., 100 F.3d 1227, 1232 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[O]nce it has been 
demonstrated that a party possessed the requisite intent to be an arranger, the party 
cannot escape liability by claiming that it had no intent to have the waste disposed in a 
particular manner or at a particular site.”) and Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 
F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993) (the term “arranged for” implies “intentional action”). 
 9 For instance, a plaintiff bringing an equal protection challenge to a facially 
neutral governmental action that has a disparate impact on a protected class has the 
burden of proving that the government acted intentionally to discriminate. Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). 
 10 For instance, the Model Penal Code distinguishes between mens reas 
sufficient for culpability by describing different levels of intentionality. The distinction 
between a “purposeful” and “knowledgeable” mens rea in the Model Penal Code was 
meant to clarify logically inconsistent application of a mens rea of “intent” used in 
many states’ criminal statutes. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 
1955). 
 11 See, e.g., R.A. Duff, The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie, 1990 
CRIM. L. REV. 637-42; Nicola Lacey, A Clear Conception of Intention: Elusive or 
Illusory? 56 MOD. L. REV. 621 (1993); Alan Norrie, Oblique Intention and Legal Politics, 
1989 CRIM. L. REV. 793-807.  
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sophisticated, and perhaps universal, system of criteria. 
Strikingly, these criteria are not limited to judgments about an 
actor’s mental state, but instead encompass judgments based 
on the moral status of an action’s consequences. 
In Part I, we discuss Shell and another recent Supreme 
Court case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for 
a Great Oregon,12 which also turned on questions of 
intentionality. We explore the parties’ arguments as to 
whether the action triggering liability in each case requires a 
purposeful mental state or can be satisfied with knowledge. 
Part II explores the body of experimental research that looks 
empirically at the ways in which people actually use the 
concept of intentional action in ordinary language. In Part III, 
we bring together the legal and empirical issues discussed in 
earlier sections, examining the ways in which empirical data 
about the way people actually use certain concepts might bear 
on the Supreme Court’s reasoning regarding the requisite 
degree of intentionality in the Shell and Babbitt case studies. 
I. TWO CASE STUDIES 
At first blush, Shell appears to be a straightforward 
case of statutory interpretation. The Court was asked to choose 
between competing interpretations of “arranged for disposal,” a 
phrase laden with ambiguity as to whether a purpose to 
dispose of hazardous substances is necessary or whether 
knowledge that disposal will occur can be sufficient.13 That 
semantic determination, however, is grounded in a judgment 
about intentionality, and, more specifically, requires the Court 
to decide the degree of intentionality suggested in vague 
statutory wording.  
Courts are often asked to draw bright lines between 
levels of intentionality when language makes those bright lines 
difficult to discern. Judges turn to dictionaries and legislative 
histories to help them parse the clearest reading of unclear 
  
 12 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 13 The Court acknowledged that “CERCLA does not define what it means to 
‘arrange for’ disposal of a hazardous substance.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. 
United States (Shell Oil Co.), 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1879 (2009) (citing Cello-Foil Prods., 100 
F.3d at 1231; Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751; Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 
893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
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phrases,14 but their ultimate conclusions about sufficient 
intentionality are likely also infused with some intuitive sense 
of intentionality. In situations where linguistic ambiguity 
increases the likelihood that intuitions will play a role in 
drawing a line in the murky terrain between acting for a 
purpose versus acting with knowledge, it is helpful to 
understand what empirical research tells us about human 
intuitions about intentionality. It is, above all, this intuitive 
human sense that we wish to explore in this paper.  
In this section, we introduce the competing arguments 
in two cases where the Court was forced to make a 
determination about sufficient intentionality for liability based 
on determinations of statutory language. Shell is the more 
recent of the two, but the other also involved strong arguments 
about whether liability was triggered by acting for the specific 
purpose of causing environmental harm versus knowing that 
environmental harm would occur. In that case, Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,15 the Court 
determined the level of intentionality required under the 
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)16 for an actor to be held 
criminally and civilly liable for “taking” an endangered species. 
Curiously, although both cases presented statutory ambiguity, 
the Court took different stances in the two cases. These 
divergent results in Shell and Babbitt are thus useful lenses for 
exploring how folk judgments about intentionality can inform 
legal reasoning, particularly when an agent knows that its 
actions will lead to a particular outcome, but does not act for 
the specific purpose of bringing about that outcome. 
A. The Litigants’ Positions in Shell 
Because of the ambiguity inherent in the phrase 
“arranged for disposal,” the parties in Shell differed sharply 
over whether CERCLA required that an agent specifically act 
for the purpose of disposing of hazardous waste in order to be 
held liable for the costs of remediation. Central to Shell’s 
argument was its interpretation of CERCLA as requiring a 
purpose to dispose of hazardous waste rather than knowledge 
  
 14 See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128-34 (1998) 
(employing a textual analysis and an inquiry into legislative history to parse the 
meaning of the statutory term “carry”). 
 15 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 16 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). 
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that leaks would foreseeably occur.17 The government, on the 
other hand, argued that Shell did act as an arranger under 
CERCLA because its knowledge that leaks would directly occur 
was a sufficient level of intentionality to trigger arranger 
liability.18 Traditionally, courts have read ambiguous phrases in 
CERCLA to permit liberal imposition of liability in order to 
achieve the act’s remedial goals.19 
Shell grounded its claim that CERCLA commands a 
purpose to dispose in what it saw as the most logical reading of 
“arranged for.” It argued that the plain meaning of “arranged 
for” implies intent because the preposition “for” indicates a 
purpose.20 Reading the words “arranged for” together with 
“disposal,” Shell also argued that it intended to arrange for the 
sale of a useful product, not to arrange for disposal.21 That is, 
Shell did not believe it could be held liable since its primary 
objective was to enter into a contract to sell and transport the 
pesticide, not to contract with the distributor to dispose of the 
pesticide.22 Despite any statutory definitions of “disposal” that 
may suggest that disposal can occur unintentionally, Shell 
argued that it is logically incoherent to claim that a party could 
  
 17 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 18-19, Shell Oil Co. v. United States, No. 
07-1607 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2008); Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2, Shell Oil Co. 
v. United States, No. 07-1607 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 2009). 
 18 Brief of Respondent at 17-19, Shell Oil Co. v. United States, No. 07-1607 
(9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2008). 
 19 See, e.g., United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 
948 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We have avoided giving the term ‘arranger’ too narrow an 
interpretation to avoid frustrating CERCLA’s goal of requiring that companies 
responsible for the introduction of hazardous waste into the environment pay for 
remediation.”); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th 
Cir. 1989) (“While the legislative history of CERCLA sheds little light on the intended 
meaning of [‘arranged for disposal’], courts have concluded that a liberal judicial 
interpretation is consistent with CERCLA’s ‘overwhelming remedial’ statutory 
scheme.”); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 
(1st Cir. 1986) (“CERCLA is essentially a remedial statute designed by Congress to 
protect and preserve public health and the environment. We are therefore obligated to 
construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative 
purposes.”) rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 
1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (“We will not interpret section 9607(a) in any way that 
apparently frustrates the statute’s goals, in the absence of a specific congressional 
intention otherwise.”). 
 20 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 17, at 18; Reply Brief of 
Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 17, at 3. 
 21 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 17, at 20. 
 22 Id. (“The intent requirement embodied in the phrase ‘arranged for’ is not 
satisfied where, as here, there is no evidence that Shell intended to do anything more 
than arrange for the sale (not disposal) of a useful product (not hazardous waste) and 
transfer ownership, possession and control before unloading.”). 
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arrange for an accident.23 Shell saw the regular pattern of 
leakage and spillage of the pesticide as accidental occurrences, 
not incidents that were desired or sought after.24 From Shell’s 
perspective, “arrang[ing] for disposal” requires a specific 
purpose to dispose, and knowledge of leakage or spillage is not 
sufficient for imposition of CERCLA arranger liability.25  
The government’s contention that arranger liability 
applied to Shell depended on an interpretation of “arranged for 
disposal” that permits liability when a party has knowledge 
that disposal will occur. In contrast to Shell, the government 
argued that the plain reading of CERCLA suggests no intent to 
dispose requirement, because CERCLA’s definition of disposal 
encompasses accidental processes such as “spilling” and 
“leaking.”26 That is, the government’s theory posited that when 
a party enters a transaction that it knows will directly result in 
either intentional or unintentional disposal of hazardous 
substances, that party has arranged for disposal.27 This theory 
recognized that “the delivery of a useful product [may be] the 
ultimate purpose” of a transaction, but that knowledge that 
spills would certainly occur as a side effect “was sufficient to 
establish Shell’s intent to dispose of hazardous substances.”28 
The government argued that this interpretation of “arranged 
for disposal” reflects CERCLA’s remedial statutory scheme.29 
Affirming the district court’s holding that Shell was an 
arranger under section 9607(a)(3) of CERCLA, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals elaborated on the circumstances 
under which a party is subject to arranger liability.30 The court 
recognized two types of arranger liability: “direct” arranger 
  
 23 See id. at 21 (“Although the statute defines disposal to include spilling, the 
critical words for present purposes are ‘arranged for.’ The words imply intentional 
action. The only thing that [the defendant] arranged for [a common carrier] to do was 
to deliver [a chemical] to [a customer’s] storage tanks. It did not arrange for spilling 
the stuff on the ground. No one arranges for an accident.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Judge Posner in Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 
1993))). 
 24 See id. 
 25 Id. at 18-20. 
 26 Brief of Respondent, supra note 18, at 17 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) 
(2006) (adopting the definition of “disposal” in 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3)). 
 27 Id. at 17-18. 
 28 Id. at 24. 
 29 Id. at 19. 
 30 United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 917, 948 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
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liability, and “broader” arranger liability.31 Direct liability 
results when the central purpose of a transaction is to dispose 
of hazardous waste.32 Broader liability results when there may 
be a separate specific purpose of the transaction, but the 
“transactions . . . contemplate disposal as a part of, but not the 
focus of, the transaction.”33 The court noted that the broader 
form of arranger liability “can involve situations, like the 
present one, in which the alleged arrangers did not contract 
directly for the disposal of hazardous substances but did 
contract for the sale or transfer of hazardous substances, which 
were then disposed of.”34 In this “broader” context, the disposal 
of the hazardous waste is a “foreseeable byproduct of, but not 
the purpose of,” the transaction between Shell and the 
distributor that led to hazardous waste contamination.35 That 
is, even though Shell did not specifically act for the purpose of 
disposing of the pesticide, it was liable because it knew with 
certainty that leakage and spillage of the pesticide would result 
from its arrangement with the distributor.36 
B. The Litigants’ Positions in Babbitt 
The arguments that arose in Babbitt, decided fourteen 
years before Shell, raised a similar debate about the degree of 
intentionality required for liability under a federal statute. The 
plaintiffs in Babbitt, a group representing small landowners 
  
 31 Id. (citing United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 
2002)). 
 32 Id. at 948. 
 33 Id.  
 34 Id. at 948-49. 
 35 Id. at 948. 
 36 The court cited six factors that demonstrate the foreseeability of the 
disposal: 
(1) Spills occurred every time the deliveries were made; (2) Shell arranged for 
delivery and chose the common carrier that transported its product to the . . . 
site; (3) Shell changed its delivery process so as to require the use of large 
storage tanks, thus necessitating the transfer of large quantities of chemicals 
and causing leakage from corrosion of the large steel tanks; (4) Shell provided 
a rebate for improvements in [the distributor’s] bulk handling and safety 
facilities and required an inspection by a qualified engineer; (5) Shell 
regularly would reduce the purchase price of the [pesticide], in an amount the 
district court concluded was linked to loss from leakage; and (6) Shell 
distributed a manual and created a checklist of the manual requirements, to 
ensure that [the pesticide] tanks were being operated in accordance with 
Shell’s safety instructions. 
Id. at 950-51. 
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and logging companies, brought a facial challenge to a 
regulation that clarified prohibitions on “harm[ing]” 
endangered species under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
(“ESA”).37 Under section 9 of the ESA, it is unlawful to “take” 
an endangered or threatened species,38 and section 3 of the 
statute defines the term “take” as “to harass, harm, pursue, 
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect . . . .”39 Adding 
meaning to the “harm” prohibition from the “take” definition, 
the Department of Interior regulation clarified that unlawful 
“harm” to an endangered species is “an act which actually kills 
or injures wildlife,” then made clear that “[s]uch act may 
include significant habitat modification or degradation where it 
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing 
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or 
sheltering.”40  
This regulation deprived the plaintiffs of deriving 
maximum economic value from their land through logging and 
other forest products operations, because their land was home 
to the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker and the 
threatened northern spotted owl.41 Had the plaintiffs knowingly 
engaged in logging or other habitat modification activities that 
actually resulted in death or injury to members of these 
species, they would have been liable for criminal and civil 
penalties under the ESA.42 The plaintiffs had not yet modified 
the habitats of the listed species, and thus had not yet incurred 
civil or criminal penalties at the time of their lawsuit; instead, 
they chose to challenge the Secretary’s regulation on its face as 
an impermissible interpretation of the ESA. In other words, 
they could foresee that if they engaged in habitat modification, 
with the purpose of earning money, then their logging and 
other activities would have the side effect of actually killing or 
  
 37 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).  
 38 Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B). 
 39 Id. § 1532(19). 
 40 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006). 
 41 The Endangered Species Act defines an endangered species as “any species 
which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range” and 
a threatened species as one “likely to become an endangered species within the 
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1532(6), (20). 
 42 Section 11 of the ESA permits up to one year of prison and a $50,000 fine 
for “knowingly” taking an individual member of an endangered species. Id. § 1540(b). 
Courts have held that section 11 imposes a general, not specific, intent standard. See 
United States v. Nguyen, 916 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1990). The Fish and Wildlife Service 
has promulgated a regulation asserting that section 11 applies to threatened species as 
well as endangered species. 50 C.F.R. 17.31(a). 
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injuring members of endangered or threatened species. This 
consequence would result in liability for the plaintiff property 
owners based on the indirect harms caused by habitat 
modification. 
The crux of Sweet Home’s argument was that the 
prohibition on takings in the ESA does not cover habitat 
modification, but rather only disallows direct, purposeful 
efforts to harm an endangered or threatened species.43 Sweet 
Home contended that the plain meaning of the word “harm,” in 
its context as a statutory descriptor of “take,” connotes 
“purposeful efforts to injure or capture wildlife; the direct 
application of force to, or physical intrusions on, specific 
creatures; direct and concrete injury to identifiable animals; 
and actions which a specifically acting human does to a specific 
creature.”44 In promoting a narrow definition of “harm,” Sweet 
Home argued that the Court should read the ambiguity 
inherent in the statutory language to require that actors 
intentionally harm discrete animals.45 According to Sweet 
Home’s view, vagueness in the ESA should not extend liability 
to “ordinary actions” of habitat modification that 
“unintentionally deprive listed wildlife of some environmental 
benefit” like breeding grounds or access to food.46 In repeatedly 
insisting that, in the ESA context, “harm” can only mean a 
“purposeful effort to injure” discrete animals, Sweet Home 
made the case that the takings prohibition could not include 
foreseeably harmful effects on individuals within the species.47 
That is, to violate the ESA under Sweet Home’s theory, an 
actor must have acted for the purpose of harming the 
individual in the species, not merely have known that habitat 
modification actions would eventually harm individuals in the 
species by impacting essential species behaviors. 
Disagreeing with Sweet Home’s insistence that “take” 
clearly mandates direct and intentional harm as prerequisites 
to liability, the government found no suggestion in ESA 
language that called for any cabining of the word “harm” with 
  
 43 Brief for Respondents at *6, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for 
a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859), 1995 WL 130541. 
 44 Id. at *8, *13 (emphasis added). 
 45 Id. at *13 n.15 (arguing that harm, like the word “kill,” requires 
“intentional and directed conduct”). 
 46 Id. at *8-*9, *13. 
 47 Id. at *10. 
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an intent requirement.48 Pointing to section 11 of the ESA, 
which explicitly imposes a knowing mens rea on violations of 
the ESA, the government argued that an actor violates the 
ESA whenever it “knows, for example, that his action harasses, 
harms, or wounds the types of species affected.”49 In the 
government’s view, neither knowledge that the species is listed 
nor a specific intent to violate the ESA is required under the 
statute; rather, knowledge that one’s behavior will harm a 
species by significantly disrupting its essential behaviors is 
sufficient.50  
The government used the breadth of several other words 
in the ESA definition of “take,” including “harass,” “wound,” 
and “pursue,” to further its claim that “harm” permits 
imposition of liability on parties that knowingly modify 
habitats of listed species while foreseeing harm to those 
species.51 This breadth, according to the government, underlies 
Congress’ intent to halt extinction and promote species 
preservation in the ESA. Analogizing the prohibition on 
“harming” to “wounding” a listed animal, the government 
noted, “[W]ounding a protected species violates the ESA even if 
it is the unintended consequence of otherwise lawful activity 
directed at a different object.”52 That is, if an actor specifically 
intends and desires to engage in a lawful activity, he will be 
liable under the ESA if he knows that his habitat modification 
activities will significantly disrupt species behaviors in a way 
that causes injury or death to members of the species. 
Reversing itself on an earlier ruling, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals determined that the Department of Interior 
regulation was an impermissible construction of “harm” within 
the meaning of the ESA.53 The court determined that the 
regulation’s inclusion of habitat modification in the definition 
  
 48 Reply Brief for the Petitioners at *1, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859), 1995 WL 170170.  
 49 Id. at *2. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at *2 n.2. 
 52 Id. at *4. 
 53 Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 
1463, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Court of Appeals initially determined that the word 
“harm” was broad enough to permit a wide range of interpretations, and found the 
agency’s interpretation reasonable. Id. After taking the rare step of granting a petition 
for rehearing, the court reversed its earlier holding, concluding that the statutory 
words surrounding “harm” counseled against interpreting the word broadly. Id. at 
1464-65. The three-judge panel split into an opinion of the court, a concurrence, and a 
dissent. Id. at 1464. 
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of “harm” was too broad of an interpretation of the term.54 
Reading “harm” in the context of the surrounding verbs also 
defining “take,” the court understood “harm” to mean “a 
substantially direct application of force” against the listed 
species.55 Although directness of force and a purpose or desire to 
harm are conceptually linked, the D.C. Circuit’s majority 
opinion did not directly address intentionality. Judge Sentelle’s 
concurring opinion, however, reincorporated his earlier 
contention that the ESA does require that an actor act 
intentionally:  
In the present statute, all the other terms among which “harm” finds 
itself keeping company relate to an act which a specifically acting 
human does to a specific individual representative of a wildlife 
species. In fact, they are the sorts of things an individual human 
commonly does when he intends to “take” an animal. Otherwise put, 
if I were intent on taking a rabbit, a squirrel, or a deer, as the term 
“take” is used in common English parlance, I would go forth with my 
dogs or my guns . . . .56 
Reading Judge Williams’ majority opinion and Judge Sentelle’s 
concurring opinion together, the D.C. Circuit held that 
foreseeably harmful effects on listed species resulting from 
habitat modification are not enough to trigger liability. Instead, 
an actor is liable under the “harm” prong of the takings 
prohibition when he directly and intentionally causes death or 
injury to an endangered or threatened animal. 
II. THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In short, although the Supreme Court faced very 
different cases in Shell and Babbitt, these two cases ended up 
involving the same basic issue: how to determine the precise 
conditions under which an act counts as “intentional.” In both 
cases, the Court was faced with an agent that knew that it 
would bring about a particular outcome as a side effect to its 
primary objective, but that did not act for the purpose of 
bringing about that outcome. The question was whether such 
an agent could be deemed to have acted intentionally. In Part 
III, we examine how the Supreme Court answered this 
question in Shell and Babbitt. This Part, however, will look at 
  
 54 Id. at 1465.  
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 1472 (Sentelle, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Sweet 
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
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studies that give indication as to how ordinary people might 
have answered it. 
At least initially, it might be thought that this question 
is a highly technical one, the sort of thing about which ordinary 
people would not have a definite opinion either way. As it 
happens, though, recent work in experimental philosophy 
suggests that these appearances are deceiving. In fact, 
experimental research indicates that people have a quite 
complex and sophisticated understanding of the criteria for 
intentional action. Indeed, it may be that these criteria are a 
universal feature of our human cognitive capacities. Though 
most people cannot articulate at an abstract level the 
properties a behavior would have to have to be intentional, 
they show remarkably consistent patterns in their intuitions 
about concrete cases. 
To examine people’s ordinary criteria for intentional 
action, experimental philosophers therefore proceed by 
presenting people with hypotheticals and asking whether the 
agents in these hypotheticals acted “intentionally” or 
“unintentionally.” By systematically varying the fact pattern of 
the hypotheticals themselves, one can then determine which 
factors influence people’s ordinary intentional action 
intuitions. Thus, if one wants to arrive at a better 
understanding of the roles of purpose and knowledge in 
people’s ordinary conception of intentional action, one can 
present experimental subjects with hypotheticals in which an 
agent does not specifically act for the purpose of bringing about 
a particular outcome but does know that the outcome will arise 
as a result of his or her actions. One can then look empirically 
at the precise conditions under which subjects do and do not 
say that such outcomes were brought about intentionally. 
Appropriately enough, one of the key experimental 
studies in this research program involves an agent who either 
helps or harms the environment.57 Subjects in the “help 
condition” of the experiment received the following 
hypothetical about an agent who does not specifically have a 
desire to help the environment but who does know that his 
actions will bring about environmental help: 
  
 57 Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, 
63 ANALYSIS 190 (2003). 
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The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board 
and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us 
increase profits, and it will also help the environment.” 
The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about 
helping the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I 
can. Let’s start the new program.” 
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was 
helped.58 
These subjects were then asked whether or not the chairman of 
the board helped the environment intentionally.59 
Subjects in the “harm condition” received a hypothetical 
that was exactly the same, except that the word “help” was 
replaced with “harm”: 
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board 
and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us 
increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.” 
The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about 
harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I 
can. Let’s start the new program.” 
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was 
harmed.60 
These subjects were then asked whether the chairman harmed 
the environment intentionally.61 
The results revealed a striking asymmetry. Most 
subjects in the harm condition (82%) judged that the chairman 
harmed the environment intentionally, while relatively few 
subjects in the help condition (23%) reported that the chairman 
helped the environment intentionally.62 Yet it seems that the 
only major difference between these cases lies in the moral 
status of the behavior the agent preformed. Hence, it appears 
that people’s moral judgments have an impact on their views 
as to whether a behavior is performed intentionally or 
unintentionally.  
More specifically, the results indicate that people’s 
moral judgments affect the role of knowledge and purpose in 
their intuitions about intentional action. There does not seem 
  
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
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to be any single answer, applicable in all cases, as to whether 
people think that an agent acts intentionally if he or she has 
knowledge of an outcome but lacks a specific purpose to bring 
about that outcome. Instead, people’s intuitions in such cases 
seem to depend on the moral status of the behavior itself. If the 
behavior is morally good, people regard it as unintentional, 
whereas if it is morally bad, people regard it as intentional. 
Though this result may seem surprising, it has been replicated 
in numerous further experiments.63 Regardless of whether 
people are thinking about the environment,64 about military 
strategy,65 or just about a person whose behavior will impact 
the neighborhood kids,66 they show the same overall pattern of 
intuitions. In cases where the agent has knowledge but lacks a 
specific purpose, they are inclined to regard the action as 
intentional when it is morally bad but not when it is morally 
good.  
Subsequent research revealed that this basic effect 
continues to emerge across a wide variety of subject 
populations and experimental procedures. It emerges when the 
hypotheticals are translated into Hindi and given to native 
Hindi speakers.67 It emerges when the hypotheticals are 
presented as puppet shows and given to children who are only 
four years old.68 It even emerges when the experiment is 
conducted on subjects who have lesions in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and therefore show massive deficits 
in the capacity for normal emotional response.69 The effect 
appears to be a highly robust aspect of our ordinary 
understanding of human action.  
In research on this issue within experimental 
philosophy, a central aim is to understand the fundamental 
  
 63 Adam Feltz, The Knobe Effect: A Brief Overview, 28 J. MIND & BEHAV. 265 
(2007). 
 64 Knobe, supra note 57, at 191. 
 65 Mark Phelan & Hagop Sarkissian, Is the ‘Trade-off Hypothesis’ Worth 
Trading For?, 24 MIND & LANGUAGE 164, 173 (2009). 
 66 Fiery Cushman & Alfred Mele, Intentional Action: Two and a Half Folk 
Concepts, in EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 171, 185 (Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols 
eds., 2008). 
 67 Joshua Knobe & Arudra Burra, The Folk Concepts of Intention and 
Intentional Action: A Cross-Cultural Study, 6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 113 (2006). 
 68 Alan Leslie, Joshua Knobe & Adam Cohen, Acting Intentionally and the 
Side-Effect Effect: ‘Theory of Mind’ and Moral Judgment, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 421 (2006). 
 69 Liane Young et al., Does Emotion Mediate the Relationship Between an 
Action’s Moral Status and its Intentional Status? Neuropsychological Evidence, 6 J. 
COGNITION & CULTURE 291 (2006). 
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cognitive processes that lie at the root of this effect. The effort 
to describe these processes has led to an increasingly complex 
and wide-ranging debate, with a bewildering variety of 
theoretical proposals and a conflicting array of different 
experimental studies.70 Here, however, we will be putting all of 
these controversial issues to one side. Our aim is not to 
speculate about the underlying cognitive processes but simply 
to describe the patterns observed in people’s ordinary 
intuitions. For the present exploration, we will be especially 
concerned with one key result. In cases where an agent 
performs a behavior with a morally bad outcome, if the agent 
does not act for the purpose of bringing about that outcome but 
does know that the outcome will result, studies show that 
people have a consistent tendency to regard the behavior as 
intentional.71  
III. A ROLE FOR THE EMPIRICAL DATA IN STATUTORY 
ANALYSIS 
With this empirical framework in hand, we can now 
return to the cases of Shell and Babbitt. We noted above that 
the litigants in both of these cases offered specific proposals 
about how to apply the notion of acting intentionally. In this 
section, we examine the actual decisions the Court made in 
evaluating these proposals.  
A. The Court’s Decisions in Shell and Babbitt 
The Court announced its decision in Shell in May 2009, 
ruling 8-1 in favor of Shell.72 In his majority opinion, Justice 
Stevens began by clarifying the outer bounds of CERCLA 
liability, noting that liability under CERCLA would clearly 
  
 70 See generally Cushman & Mele, supra note 66 (explaining the effect in 
terms of three different rules that subjects apply in different cases); Edouard Machery, 
The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues, 23 
MIND & LANGUAGE 165 (2008) (explaining the effect in terms of a “trade-off” between a 
benefit and a cost); Shaun Nichols & Joseph Ulatowski, Intuitions and Individual 
Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited, 22 MIND & LANGUAGE 346 (2007) (explaining 
the effect in terms of two distinct interpretations of the expression “intentionally”); 
Dean Pettit & Joshua Knobe, The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment, MIND & 
LANGUAGE (forthcoming) (explaining the effect in terms of a comparison between the 
agent’s attitude and a norm for what that attitude should be).  
 71 Joshua Knobe, The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses 
of Folk Psychology, 130 PHIL. STUD. 203, 209 (2006). 
 72 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States (Shell Oil Co.), 129 S. Ct. 
1870, 1880 (2009). 
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attach to any entity that entered into a transaction “for the sole 
purpose of discarding a . . . hazardous substance.”73 At the other 
extreme, a party could not be liable under CERCLA if it 
entered into a transaction with the purpose of selling a useful 
product, yet was unaware that the buyer disposed of the useful 
hazardous substance in a manner that caused environmental 
contamination. Such easy cases are rare, and Justice Stevens 
acknowledged that in the vast middle area of cases where the 
seller has some knowledge of the buyer’s disposal, courts must 
engage in a fact-intensive inquiry to determine if liability is 
proper.74 
Attempting to give meaning to CERCLA’s undefined 
term “arranged for,” the Court then proceeded to parse what it 
viewed as the ordinary meaning of the term.75 Under the 
Court’s reading of “arranged for,” an entity may qualify as an 
arranger under CERCLA “when it takes intentional steps to 
dispose of a hazardous substance.”76 That is, the Court 
determined that the statute called for intentional action. 
Addressing the government’s contention that foresight of spills 
is sufficient to establish intent to dispose under CERCLA, the 
Court concluded that in this case, the “evidence does not 
support an inference that Shell intended such spills to occur.”77 
Justice Stevens characterized the spills as minor and 
accidental, and viewed Shell’s attempts to reduce spills as 
evidence of a lack of intent for spills to occur rather than as 
evidence of the foreseeability of hazardous waste spillage.78 
The Court’s reasoning in Babbitt led it to arrive at the 
opposite conclusion. Justice Stevens’s 6-3 majority opinion held 
that knowledge that harm to endangered species would be a 
side effect of otherwise lawful activity was sufficient to trigger 
liability.79 At the outset, the Court assumed that logging and 
habitat modification activities “will have the effect, even 
though unintended, of detrimentally changing the natural 
habitat . . . and that, as a consequence, members of those 
species will be killed or injured.”80 That is, just as in Shell, the 
  
 73 Id. at 1878. 
 74 Id. at 1879. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 1880. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 
687, 697 (1995). 
 80 Id. at 696. 
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environmental harm in Babbitt was foreseeable and certain to 
occur as a side effect of the plaintiffs’ actions. Unlike Shell, 
however, the Court deemed reasonable the government’s 
interpretation of “harm” as permitting liability when an actor 
knows that his actions will “result[] in actual injury or death to 
members of an endangered or threatened species.”81 In a 
footnote, the Court also acknowledged that the ESA specifically 
imposes a criminal mens rea of “knowing,” which incorporates 
“ordinary requirements of proximate causation and 
foreseeability.”82  
Notably, the Court’s majority opinion devoted few lines 
to actively discussing the level of intent suggested semantically 
by the word “harm,” choosing instead to emphasize the effects 
on endangered and threatened species that would result from 
the habitat modification activities.83 Interpreting a subsequent 
amendment to the ESA as probative of Congress’ 
understanding of the meaning of “harm” within section 3, the 
Court reasoned that “Congress had in mind foreseeable, rather 
than merely accidental, effects on listed species.”84 Such 
language frames the Court’s analysis of the case in terms of 
the outcome of habitation modification, as opposed to whether 
or not the plain meaning of the word “harm” requires a 
purpose to harm or knowledge that harm will certainly occur. 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor agreed with this 
consequences-oriented basis for deciding the case. Noting that 
the regulation is limited to foreseeable effects on listed species, 
she concurred because the regulation was also “limited by its 
terms to actions that actually kill or injure individual 
animals.”85 
Justice Scalia’s dissent vigorously argued that the ESA 
called for intentional action as a prerequisite to liability. 
Choosing to interpret “take” as the operative word in the ESA, 
Justice Scalia recounted various statutory and common law 
precedents to conclude that “take” implies actions “done 
directly and intentionally.”86 Turning next to the word “harm,” 
  
 81 Id. at 697. The Court also noted that Chevron deference to the agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of “harm” was appropriate because the ESA was not 
unambiguous. Id. at 703 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). 
 82 Id. at 696 n.9. 
 83 See id. at 696-98. 
 84 Id. at 700. 
 85 Id. at 709 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 86 Id. at 718 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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his dissent interpreted “harm” in light of its nine surrounding 
words, and concluded that these words all call for “conduct 
intentionally directed against a particular animal or animals.”87 
This conclusion that “take” and “harm” suggest that 
intentionality is a necessary condition for liability under the 
ESA contrasts with the majority’s reasoning, which rested 
much of its holding on the outcome-oriented language of the 
government’s regulation.  
B. Applying the Experimental Results to the Court’s 
Decisions 
Although both of these cases involved statutory 
ambiguity as to the level of intentionality required for liability, 
the Court appears to have taken a different approach in each 
case to arrive at its conclusion about sufficient intentionality. 
The decision in Shell was that liability is triggered when an 
entity specifically acts for the purpose of disposing of 
hazardous substances, whereas the decision in Babbitt was 
that foreseeability of death or injury to listed species is 
sufficient to trigger liability. A question now arises as to how to 
think about these different approaches and which would be 
appropriate to which sorts of cases.  
In thinking about such questions, the Court must 
balance a wide array of competing considerations. It considers 
relevant precedent, apparent congressional intent, the Chevron 
doctrine’s two-step analysis,88 and a host of other factors. In 
this article, however, we will not attempt to discuss the full 
range of such issues. Instead, we focus on just one type of 
consideration that figured in the two cases discussed above. In 
Babbitt and Shell, the litigants and the Court appealed to 
notions about how intentionality is suggested by statutory 
language. Our aim is to introduce another consideration that 
may aid judicial attempts to parse appropriate intentionality 
from unclear language.  
Drawing on the experimental evidence described above, 
we argue that people’s ordinary criteria for intentional action 
differ in certain respects from the criteria the Court invoked in 
  
 87 Id. at 720. 
 88 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984) (when Congress has directly spoken to an issue in a statute, the agency must 
follow Congress’ command, but when a statute is ambiguous, courts must defer to 
reasonable agency interpretations of the statute). 
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its decisions. Indeed, the evidence suggests that people’s 
ordinary way of understanding these issues is quite different 
from the one employed by the Court. It is not just that people’s 
ordinary criteria depart from the Court’s criteria in one or 
another minor detail; rather, people seem to be departing from 
the Court’s criteria in the basic structure of their decision-
making process itself.  
In the two cases under discussion here, the Court 
treated questions about whether an entity acts intentionally as 
quite separate from questions about whether the entity had 
actually done anything morally harmful or wrong. The Court’s 
reasoning suggested that questions about whether an entity 
acted intentionally were ultimately to be decided by the mental 
states of the entity itself, such as whether it had a specific 
purpose or mere knowledge. After the issue of intentionality is 
decided, there may then be additional questions about harm 
and fault, and these questions may play a role in judgments as 
to whether the entity is liable for any damages, but such issues 
were thought not to be relevant to the more basic question as to 
whether the act itself was intentional or unintentional.  
So, for example, after Shell, an entity can only qualify 
as an “arranger” under CERCLA to the extent that it 
intentionally arranges for the disposal of hazardous 
substances, and that entity can only be said to have acted 
“intentionally” to the extent that it acted for the relevant 
purpose.89 However, the moral status of the environmental 
harm caused is entirely irrelevant to a determination about 
whether an entity can be considered an arranger.  
As we noted in Part II, people’s ordinary judgments do 
not seem to work this way. People do not seem to create a strict 
separation between questions of intentionality and questions of 
morality, such that the latter can never be relevant to the 
former. They do not seem to set up a single, invariant standard 
for intentional action that is applied to all cases, whether they 
be morally good or morally bad. Instead, people seem to treat 
moral judgments as relevant in some fundamental way to 
judgments of intentionality. In cases where the agent had 
knowledge but not purpose, their intentionality judgments 
seem to vary depending on whether they regard the behavior 
as morally good or morally bad.  
  
 89 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States (Shell Oil Co.), 129 S. Ct. 
1870, 1878-80 (2009). 
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Hence, if people are faced with the question as to 
whether certain entities “intentionally” arranged for the 
disposal of hazardous substances, they will not simply pick out 
some single type of state and decide all cases by checking to see 
whether the entity has that state. It is not as though they will 
always require that the agent act for the purpose of disposing, 
nor will they always regard mere knowledge as sufficient, nor 
will they take any other state of the agent to always be 
necessary and sufficient in every case. Instead, people’s 
intuitions will vary depending on the moral judgment they 
make about the case at hand. They will take purpose to be 
necessary in cases where they judge that disposing of 
hazardous substances is morally good, whereas they will take 
knowledge to be sufficient in cases where they judge that 
disposing of hazardous substances is morally bad.90 Morally 
neutral cases will lead to a judgment that lies somewhere in 
between.91  
Suppose we now apply this approach to the decision the 
Court faced in Shell. We would no longer regard it as adequate 
to look only at the degree to which Shell showed knowledge or 
purpose; we would also be concerned with questions about the 
moral status of the spills and leaks brought about by Shell’s 
actions. Here, however, one finds a moral consensus in 
contemporary American society. Congress originally passed 
CERCLA amid a public outcry over the moral blameworthiness 
of the corporations that failed to clean up hazardous waste 
sites,92 and empirical studies indicate that people continue to 
attach strong moral blame to the actors who created hazardous 
waste dumps.93 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has permitted courts 
to consider the “moral contribution” of owners of a hazardous 
waste disposal site in determining contribution amounts under 
  
 90 For a review, see Knobe, supra note 71. 
 91 Fiery Cushman & Alfred Mele, Intentional Action, Folk Judgments and 
Stories: Sorting Things Out, 31 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 184, 187, 199 (2007). 
 92 See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste 
Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 
706, 707-13 (1998) (describing the public notion of the “evil polluter” motivating 
CERCLA’s passage, and arguing that “the blaming system underlying CERCLA has 
allowed us to visualize the genesis of hazardous waste sites in the actions of a few evil 
corporations that can be punished and purged”).  
 93 See, e.g., James M. Jasper, The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive 
Emotions in and around Social Movements, 13 SOC. F. 397, 411 (1998) (describing a 
hazardous waste dump as a focused environmental threat “yielding a clear perpetrator 
to blame”).  
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CERCLA.94 Applying people’s ordinary criteria for intentional 
action, we would therefore arrive at the conclusion that Shell 
intentionally arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances 
and could be held liable for the morally bad environmental 
damage that resulted.95 
Turning to the decision in Babbitt, we can apply the 
same basic logic. In that case, the majority determined that 
knowledge alone would be sufficient to trigger liability, while 
Justice Scalia’s dissent argued that intentional action was 
necessary and that the logging companies could not be held 
liable for any environmental damage brought about as a mere 
side effect. We can now see that the ordinary understanding of 
intentional action would regard this debate as resting on a 
false dichotomy. As long as the outcome itself was widely 
  
 94 United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1991); see 
also David August Konuch, Note, United States v. R.W. Meyer: The Sixth Circuit 
Clarifies Courts’ Use of Equitable Discretion in CERCLA Contribution Actions, 5 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 673, 680 (1992) (commenting on the R.W. Meyer “majority’s contention 
that moral blameworthiness alone can justify forcing a defendant to pay a contribution 
percentage which is out of proportion to the harm his conduct actually caused”). 
 95 Indeed, when this question of whether foresight of hazardous waste 
spillage sufficed for the level of intent required under CERCLA was pressed by the 
justices at oral argument, Shell’s counsel appeared to intuit that knowledge could 
establish sufficient intent in this case. In other words, she appeared to contradict 
Shell’s theory of the case that interpreted CERCLA as requiring a specific purpose to 
dispose. This exchange at oral argument began with a question posed by Justice Alito: 
What if Shell had a choice between two companies to do the delivery. One 
would deliver it with no spillage whatsoever, but the other would deliver it 
with a certain amount, a small amount of spillage. And Shell chose the latter 
because it was cheaper. Would it not be arranging under those 
circumstances? 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States 
(Shell Oil Co.), 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009) (No. 07-1607). In essence, Justice Alito precisely 
described the aforementioned scenarios about the Chairman in the experimental 
hypotheticals. That is, he was imagining a situation where Shell chose a course that 
maximized profits (here, saved money), and did so with the foresight or knowledge that 
its choice would result in harm to the environment.  
  Strikingly, the linkage between knowledge and intentional action in such 
cases is so intuitively powerful that Shell’s counsel, inconsistent with her own theory, 
answered that Shell “might well be” liable under Justice Alito’s scenario. Id. Yet under 
Shell’s theory of arranger liability, Shell should not be liable regardless of whether it 
chose a cheaper carrier that happened to spill, because it would not have been Shell’s 
specific intent to dispose of the hazardous material. The spillage would have merely 
been a morally bad foreseeable side effect of Shell’s specific purpose to save money. In 
answering that Shell might well be liable if it did choose a cheaper carrier but 
contemplated disposal as a part of the transaction, however, Shell's counsel effectively 
endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s “broader” arranger liability theory and the intuitive 
judgment about Shell’s intentionality predicted by the aforementioned research. Over 
the remainder of oral argument, Shell's counsel seemingly recognized the inconsistency 
of her response and did backtrack, but later conceded that “there might be some case in 
which you might attribute knowledge, infer intent from knowledge.” Id. at 17. 
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judged a morally bad one, people’s ordinary understanding 
might say both that knowledge alone was sufficient and that 
intentional action was necessary. After all, people’s ordinary 
understanding would say that knowledge was sufficient for 
intentional action in cases in which the outcome was 
sufficiently bad. In fact, the evidence does suggest that people 
regard the killing of endangered species as morally bad,96 and 
people’s ordinary understanding of the morality of harming 
endangered and threatened species seems therefore to leave us 
with the conclusion that the logging companies would be 
intentionally harming the wildlife if they did so as a 
foreseeable side effect of attaining some other goal.  
Overall, then, people’s ordinary understanding seems to 
differ on a truly fundamental level from the criteria invoked in 
the Court’s recent decisions. People do not appear to regard 
purpose as a necessary condition for intentional action. 
Instead, their judgments are affected by their beliefs about the 
moral status of the action itself, and in cases where the 
consequence of the action appears to be morally bad, they are 
willing to take knowledge alone as sufficient for inferring 
intentionality.  
In making this argument, we do not mean to suggest 
that the Court should take facts about people’s ordinary 
understanding of intentionality to be decisive in cases like the 
ones we have been discussing here. The Court often 
appropriately finds that various other considerations, such as 
Chevron deference, stare decisis, or policy arguments, provide 
strong reasons to depart from people’s ordinary understanding 
of particular words or concepts. However, if such a situation 
does arise, it would be best to explicitly acknowledge the need 
to shift away from the practice of using words as they are 
ordinarily understood and to explain why such a shift would be 
justified. Absent some special reason, it seems that words like 
“intentionally” should be understood to have just the same 
  
 96 For instance, many commentators have cited the moral justification for 
protection of species through the Endangered Species Act. See, e.g., John Copeland 
Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1178 (1998) (“[T]he case for protecting all 
species must depend on moral, religious, or ethical arguments.”); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, 
The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered Species Act—A Noah Presumption 
and Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on Canaries in the Coalmine, 27 ENVTL. L. 845, 
851 n.26 (1997) (“There is a deeply developed moral…argument for preserving 
endangered species, and this has always been perceived as laying close to the essence 
of the Act.”); Andrew E. Wetzler, Note, The Ethical Underpinnings of the Endangered 
Species Act, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 171 (1993) (“[T]he ESA is, at least in part, a 
statute that recognizes the moral obligation of humanity to protect species . . . .”). 
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meanings they do in ordinary English, and the best way to 
uncover these meanings is through systematic empirical 
research.  
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have examined the implications of 
research in experimental philosophy for two case studies in 
environmental law. We found that the Court appeared to be 
applying the concept of intentional action in different ways in 
the different cases but that ordinary people show a surprisingly 
consistent, complex and perhaps universal system of criteria. 
These criteria involve a more holistic approach to the 
understanding of human action. People’s intuitions about what 
an agent did “intentionally” do not merely take into account 
that agent’s principal purpose. Instead, people look at the 
agent’s purpose, at the side effects that came along with an 
attempt to bring about that purpose, and at the moral status of 
the outcomes that actually resulted. To the extent that the 
Court takes into account the concept of intentional action in a 
way that accords more with people’s ordinary folk 
understanding, it will adopt a broader notion of what it means 
for an agent to intentionally bring about environmental harm.  
But the point does not stop there. These questions in 
environmental law can be seen as just one case study of a far 
more general phenomenon. The concept of intentional action 
plays a central role in numerous areas of the law, and in each 
of these areas, courts are faced with difficult decisions about 
the precise criteria under which an agent should be said to 
have acted “intentionally” or “unintentionally.” Future 
research can draw on empirical data to shed light on the ways 
in which people ordinarily make sense of this whole range of 
different cases. Though such empirical research would of 
course not become decisive in legal determinations, it would 
add an important and frequently overlooked consideration to 
the existing debate on these complex legal issues. 
